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THE UNITED STATES, CHINA, AND FREEDOM 
OF NAVIGATION IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA 
JAMES W. HOUCK

  
NICOLE M. ANDERSON

 
INTRODUCTION 
The need for a uniform understanding of international norms regarding 
freedom of navigation is increasingly important as more States develop 
capacity to act in the international maritime realm.
1
 Nowhere is the issue 
of freedom of navigation more contentious, with more potential to spark 
wider conflict, than in the South China Sea (SCS). Both the United States 
and China profess an interest in the free navigation of commercial vessels 
in the region. Beyond commercial shipping, however, the two nations 
disagree on the important issue of freedom of navigation for military 
vessels. The United States believes all nations have wide latitude under 
international law to conduct military activities at sea. China argues that 
U.S. military activities in the SCS infringe on Chinese sovereignty. The 
resolution of this dispute, which has resulted in several confrontations at 
sea between the two nations, has implications for peace and security in the 
SCS and beyond.  
I. FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION 
In its most elemental form, freedom of navigation is a ship’s or 
aircraft’s right to transit the maritime domain and conduct operations 
during such transits. Three factors help determine freedom of navigation 
rights. First, sovereignty over land territory must be established because 
maritime rights and duties generally emanate from sovereign state coastal 
territory or offshore islands. Sovereignty is, of course, a source of major 
dispute in the SCS with China, Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, 
and Taiwan all making claims to various land features.
2
 Important as these 
 
 
  Interim Dean and Distinguished Scholar in Residence, Penn State University Dickinson 
School Law.  
  First Lieutenant, U.S. Marine Corps, Penn State University Dickinson School of Law Class 
of 2014.  
 1. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397 
[hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 2. DAVID LAI, ASIA-PACIFIC: A STRATEGIC ASSESSMENT 61–62 (2013), available at 
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1155. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
442 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 13:441 
 
 
 
 
competing claims are, their merits and potential resolution are beyond the 
scope of this Article.  
Second, assuming that sovereignty over land territory and boundaries is 
clearly established, various maritime zones are derived by measuring 
distances from land features. While these measurements are often 
straightforward and undisputed, frequently they are not. China, for 
example, measures its territorial sea from a series of “straight baselines” 
along the Chinese coast.
3
 The United States argues these baselines are 
drawn without regard to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS or the Convention) rules and impermissibly increase 
Chinese sovereignty over its near-coastal waters.
4
 Separately, and entirely 
outside any UNCLOS framework, China claims a major portion of the 
SCS through assertion of a controversial “9-Dash Line.”5 Again, while the 
legitimacy of these boundaries is a key factor in regional disputes, a 
discussion of China’s claimed sea boundaries under UNCLOS or its 9-
Dash Line is beyond the scope of this Article. 
Third, once maritime zones are established in relation to sovereign 
territory, the final analysis relevant to determining freedom of navigation 
rights concerns the types of operations permitted within specific maritime 
zones. The controlling international agreement governing permissible 
conduct within international maritime zones, as well as the zones 
themselves, is UNCLOS. UNCLOS represents one of the most widely 
accepted international conventions, with 166 current member states.
6
 
China is a party to UNCLOS; the United States is not. Although the 
United States has not ratified the Convention, the U.S. government has 
long maintained that UNCLOS provisions represent customary 
international law with which the United States is committed to observing.
7
  
 
 
 3. BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE & RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, SERIES A NO. 43, STRAIGHT 
BASELINES: PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 43 (1972) (retyped 1978). 
 4. See U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 
(2014), available at http://policy.defense.gov/Portals/11/Documents/gsa/cwmd/FY2013%20DOD% 
20Annual%20FON%20Report.pdf (identifying China as having excessive maritime claims); see also 
Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, 14 COUNCIL FOREIGN REL. CONTINGENCY 
PLANNING MEMORANDA 3 (2012), available at http://i.cfr.org/content/publications/attachments/CPA_ 
contingencymemo_14.pdf. 
 5. See BEN DOLVEN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42930, MARITIME TERRITORIAL 
DISPUTES IN EAST ASIA 12 (2013). 
 6. Chronological List of Ratifications of, Accessions and Successions to the Convention and the 
related Agreements, UNITED NATIONS, www.un.org/depts/los/reference_files/chronological_lists_of_ 
ratifications.htm (last updated Sept. 20, 2013). 
 7. Accession to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and Ratification of the 1994 Agreement 
Amending Part XI of the Law of the Sea Convention: Hearing Before the S. Comm. On Foreign Rel., 
112th Cong. (2012) (statement of Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sec’y of State). 
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Within the overall UNCLOS framework, the United States and China 
disagree to what extent UNCLOS and customary international law of the 
sea allow military activities within the area known as the Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ), an area that generally extends as far as 200 miles 
from a coastal state’s shore or natural offshore islands.8 The EEZ provides 
a coastal state with “sovereign rights” for exploring, exploiting, and 
conserving natural resources and “jurisdiction” with regard to activities 
such as “marine scientific research” and “the protection and preservation 
of the marine environment.”9 
China and the United States agree that the EEZ is established for the 
economic benefit of coastal states and that ships and aircraft of all nations 
have navigation and overflight rights in the EEZ. The two powers disagree 
sharply, however, on the extent to which these rights apply to military 
operations by state warships, aircraft, and naval auxiliaries. 
II. THE UNITED STATES’ POSITION 
The United States has consistently asserted the right to conduct military 
activities in EEZs around the world,
10
 including China’s.11 In asserting 
these rights, the United States relies on a series of arguments based on 
UNCLOS text, international state practice, and UNCLOS negotiating 
history. 
A. Textual Arguments 
 UNCLOS does not expressly address which, if any, military activities 
may be conducted in an EEZ without coastal state consent. Nonetheless, 
the United States argues that military activities are justified by what 
UNCLOS says, and, importantly, what it does not say.  
The United States argues that UNCLOS Article 87 provides that “the 
high seas are open to all states” and that “[f]reedom of the high seas” 
 
 
 8. For purposes of this Article, the Chinese EEZ is considered to extend approximately 200 
miles from the Chinese mainland. See UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 57. 
 9. Id. art. 56. 
 10. Maritime Disputes and Sovereignty Issues in East Asia: Hearing before the Sen. Comm. on 
Foreign Rel., 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of Robert Scher, U.S. Deputy Assistant Sec’y of 
Defense). 
 11. RONALD O’ROURKE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42784, MARITIME TERRITORIAL AND 
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE (EEZ) DISPUTES INVOLVING CHINA 33 (2013), available at 
www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42784.pd. 
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includes the “freedom of navigation [and] overflight.”12 These rights are 
preserved in the EEZ by Article 58, which declares that all states “enjoy 
. . . the freedoms of navigation and overflight referred to in article 87 . . . 
and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to these 
freedoms.”13 The United States contends that “other internationally lawful 
uses of the sea” includes military activities.14  
The most significant limitation on the right of freedom of navigation 
and overflight in the EEZ is that it be exercised with “due regard to the . . . 
laws and regulations adopted by the coastal State in accordance with 
[UNCLOS] and other rules of international law . . . .”15 Again, the United 
States contends that no provision in UNCLOS or other rule of 
international law restricts, or authorizes China to restrict, U.S. military 
vessels and aircraft from engaging in military activities in the EEZ. 
From the U.S. perspective, the lack of any express UNCLOS 
prohibition against military activities in the EEZ is telling when compared 
to language regulating military activities in other zones. For example, 
provisions governing the territorial sea describe acts that do not satisfy the 
definition of “innocent passage” and are “prejudicial to the peace, good 
order or security of the coastal State,” such as “launching, landing or 
taking on board” of any aircraft or military device, fishing activities, 
research or survey activities, and “any threat or use of force against the 
sovereignty.”16 However, the articles regulating activities in the EEZ do 
not contain similar prohibitions, suggesting that had the UNCLOS drafters 
wanted to similarly restrict military activities in the EEZ, they would have 
done so.  
B. State Practice Arguments 
State practice has generally supported military activities in the EEZ. 
China’s interpretation that “UNCLOS gives coastal states the right to 
regulate not only economic activities, but also foreign military activities, 
 
 
 12. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 87. The “high seas” are all parts of the seas that are not included 
in the EEZ, the territorial sea or internal waters of a state, or in the archipelagic waters of an 
archipelagic state. Id. art. 86. 
 13. Id. art. 58. 
 14. Id.; see Joe Baggett & Pete Pedrozo, Briefing for Center for Naval Analysis Excessive 
Chinese Maritime Claims Workshop 20 (Aug. 7, 2013) (on file with author) [hereinafter CNA 
Maritime Claims Workshop](citing Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, vol. XVII at 240, 
243, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/37 and ADD.1-2). 
 15. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 58. 
 16. Id. art. 19; see also id. arts. 38–39, 53 (describing the rights and duties of ships and aircraft 
exercising the rights of transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage respectively). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/7
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in their EEZs,” is a viewpoint effectively held by only twenty-seven other 
countries.
17
 Even though most states have adopted policies consistent with 
the U.S. interpretation, only a handful of states actually conduct military 
activities in foreign EEZs. States known to operate military vessels in 
foreign EEZs without notice include the United States, Russia, Australia, 
South Africa, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and, ironically, China.
18
 
Australia and South Africa both conduct military activities in foreign 
EEZs throughout the Pacific without coastal State consent.
19
 Similarly, the 
U.K. operates three hydrographic survey ships and two oceanographic 
survey vessels in foreign EEZs around the world.
20
 
During the Cold War, Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels, known as 
AGIs, operated off the coasts of the United States.
21 
The AGIs were 
trailing U.S. forces so frequently that U.S. naval officers “joked about 
assigning the AGI a station in the formation” of the fleet operations.22 The 
mutual understanding between the United States and Soviets during the 
Cold War regarding military activities in the EEZ reflected the view of 
both countries that their respective vessels were entitled to operate within 
the others’ EEZ. Today, Russia maintains a fleet of seventy-four electronic 
surveillance and survey ships that operate in foreign EEZs around many 
parts of the world without coastal State consent.
23 
China recently acknowledged that it too conducts surveillance and 
marine data collection in the EEZ of foreign states, including the United 
States.
24
 On June 1, 2013, at the maritime security session of the Shangri-
La Dialogue, high-ranking Chinese military officials confirmed that China 
 
 
 17. Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Cambodia, Cape Verde, China, Egypt, Haiti, India, Iran, Kenya, 
Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, North Korea, Pakistan, Portugal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sri Lanka, 
Sudan, Syria, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Vietnam. O’ROURKE, supra 
note 11, at 4 (citing E-mail from Navy Office of Legislative Affairs to Cong. Research Serv. (June 15, 
2012)). 
 18. See CNA Maritime Claims Workshop, supra note 14, at 6; see also Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, 
Responding to Ms. Zhang’s Talking Points on the EEZ, 10 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 207 (2011). 
 19. CNA Maritime Claims Workshop, supra note 14, at 6. 
 20. Id. 
 21. AGI was a U.S. Navy classification for the Soviet vessels in question in which the A meant 
auxiliary ship, the G meant miscellaneous purpose, and the I meant that the miscellaneous purpose was 
intelligence gathering. O’ROURKE, supra note 11, at 36 n.67. 
 22. James R. Holmes, China’s Small Stick Diplomacy, DIPLOMAT (May 21, 2012), 
http://thediplomat.com/2012/05/21/chinas-small-stick-diplomacy/. 
 23. CNA Maritime Claims Workshop, supra note 14, at 6. 
 24. KIMBERLY HSU & CRAIG MURRAY, CHINA ECON. & SEC. REVIEW COMM’N, CHINA’S 
EXPANDING MILITARY OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES 1 (2013), available at 
http://origin.www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/Research/Staff%20Backgrounder_China%20in%20 Foreign 
%20EEZs.pdf.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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has sent its ships into the United States’ EEZ.25 U.S. Admiral Samuel 
Locklear, Commander of U.S. Forces in the Pacific, confirmed that 
China’s Navy has “started ‘reciprocating’ the US Navy’s practice of 
sending ships and aircraft into the 200-nautical mile zone off China’s 
coast.”26 This activity is ironic because China continues to intercept 
foreign military and fishing vessels, the United States included,
27
 and 
attempts to force them to leave.
28
 In March 2009, for example, a China 
Maritime Surveillance patrol vessel intercepted the USNS Impeccable, a 
U.S. Navy vessel,
29
 while it was conducting a military survey in China’s 
EEZ.
30 
The Impeccable was radioed by the Chinese patrol vessel and told 
that it shouldn’t be operating “without the permission of the Chinese 
government.”31  
C. Negotiating History  
Comments made during and shortly after the UNCLOS negotiations 
shed light on how participants intended the Convention to be interpreted. 
Ambassador Tommy T.B. Koh from Singapore, the President of UNCLOS 
III,
32
 recognized that the text of UNCLOS did not explicitly provide clarity 
on permissible military conduct in the EEZ, but he noted “it was the 
general understanding that the text we negotiated and agreed upon would 
permit such activities to be conducted.”33 Furthermore, Ambassador Koh 
has spoken about certain coastal states trying to apply territorial sea 
sovereignty rights in the EEZ, which he noted “is not consistent with the 
 
 
 25. Rory Medcalf, Maritime Game-Changer Revealed at Shangri-La Dialogue, DIPLOMAT (June 
2, 2013), http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2013/06/02/maritime-game-changer-revealed-at-
shangri-la-dialogue/; Kathrine Hille, Chinese Navy Begins US Economic Zone Patrols, FIN. TIMES 
(June 2, 2013), www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/02ce257e-cb4a-11e2-8ff3-00144feab7de.html#axzz2eckOys 
T2. 
 26. Hille, supra note 25; see also U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ANN. REPORT TO CONG.: MILITARY & 
SEC. DEV. INVOLVING CHINA 39 (2013) (showing that the PLA Navy has been conducting military 
activities in foreign EEZs and has been spotted several times in the U.S. EEZ around Guam and 
Hawaii).  
 27. CNA Maritime Claims Workshop, supra note 14, at 7 (citing seven notable U.S. military 
confrontations by the Chinese military in China’s EEZ since 2001). 
 28. O’ROURKE, supra note 11, at 20–27. 
 29. Maritime Issues and Sovereignty Disputes in East Asia: Hearing Before the Sen. Comm. On 
Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (statement of Scot Marciel, Deputy Assistant Sec’y of State). 
 30. Bill Gertz, Inside the Ring: New Naval Harassment in Asia, WASH. TIMES (July 17, 2013), 
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/17/inside-the-ring-new-naval-harassment-in-asia/?page=all. 
 31. William Cole, Chinese Help Plan for Huge War Game Near Isles, HONOLULU STAR-
ADVERTISER (July 25, 2013), www.staradvertiser.com/s?action=login&f=y&id=216895851&id=2168 
95851.  
 32. Pedrozo, supra note 18, at 208. 
 33. Id. at 208–11. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/7
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intention of those of us who negotiated this text, and is not consistent with 
the correct interpretation of this part [Part V] of the Convention.”34 The 
United States further points out that of the few statements made by China 
at the time of ratifying UNCLOS, only one related to military activities.
35
 
The statement related only to activities in the territorial sea, saying nothing 
about China’s objections to military activities in a coastal State’s EEZ.  
III. CHINA’S POSITION 
China rejects the position that military activities are permissible in a 
coastal state’s EEZ without prior permission.36 This position is “based on 
national security interests . . . exclusive jurisdiction over marine scientific 
research and resource management [and] environmental protection 
interests.”37  
As a threshold matter, China argues that since the United States is not a 
party to UNCLOS, the United States has no standing to make textually-
 
 
 34. Tommy T.B. Koh, Remarks on the Legal Status of the Exclusive Economic Zone, in 
FREEDOM OF SEAS, PASSAGE RIGHTS AND THE 1982 LAW OF THE SEA CONVENTION 54–55 (Myron H. 
Nordquist, Tommy T.B. Koh and John Norton Moore eds., 2009); see also UNCLOS Declarations of 
numerous maritime states: 
 Germany Declaration: “According to the Convention, the coastal State does not enjoy 
residual rights in the exclusive economic zone. In particular, the rights and jurisdiction of the 
coastal State in such zone do not include the rights to obtain notification of military exercises 
or manoeuvres or to authorize them.” 
 Italy Declaration: “In particular, the rights and jurisdiction of the coastal State in such 
zone do not include the rights to obtain notification of military exercises or manoeuvres or to 
authorize them.” 
 Netherlands Declaration: “The Convention does not authorize the coastal State to 
prohibit military exercises in its exclusive economic zone.” 
 United Kingdom Declaration: “The United Kingdom considers that declarations and 
statements not in conformity with articles 309 and 310 include, inter alia, the following: . . . 
those which are not in conformity with the provisions of the Convention relating to the 
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf, including those which claim coastal state 
jurisdiction over all installations and structures in the exclusive economic zone or on the 
continental shelf, and those which purport to require consent for exercises or manoeuvres 
(including weapons exercises) in those areas.” 
Declarations and Statements, U.N. Oceans & Law of the Sea (June 7, 1996), www.un.org/Depts/ 
los/convention_agreements/convention_declarations.htm# [hereinafter UNCLOS Declarations and 
Statements]. 
 35. “China reaffirms that the provisions of the . . . Convention . . . concerning innocent passage 
through the territorial sea shall not prejudice the right of a coastal State to request . . . a foreign State to 
obtain advance approval from or give prior notification to the coastal State for the passage of its 
warships through the territorial sea of the coastal State.” UNCLOS Declarations and Statements, supra 
note 34.  
 36. See Zewei Yang, The Freedom of Navigation in the South China Sea: An Ideal or a Reality?, 
3 BEIJING L. REV. 137, 140–41 (2012). 
 37. CNA Maritime Claims Workshop, supra note 14, at 14. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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based arguments. Although this argument has no legal consequence, it is 
useful as a diversion from substantive issues more difficult for China to 
answer. Moreover, the fact that the United States attempts to benefit from 
UNCLOS without joining the Convention also enhances the perception 
that the United States remains an intermeddling hegemon with little 
interest in true partnership with regional nations.  
To the extent Chinese commentators make specific legal arguments 
based in UNCLOS itself, they often begin from the proposition that 
military activities in the EEZ are not expressly permitted by UNCLOS, 
and therefore are prohibited without coastal state consent.
38
 It is unclear 
whether this insistence on positive legal authorization is a consistent 
feature of Chinese legal theory or merely a law of the sea expediency. In 
any case, it stands in contradiction to the longstanding Lotus Principle, 
long endorsed by the United States, that “whatever is not prohibited by 
law is permitted.”39  
China’s primary UNCLOS textually-based argument is that military 
activities in the EEZ conducted without the coastal State’s consent violate 
UNCLOS Article 301, which requires that states “shall refrain from any 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the 
principles of international law embodied in the [U.N. Charter].”40 Chinese 
commentators argue that U.S. military activities in the EEZ are facilitating 
the collection of data that could be used to support military operations 
against China in violation of Article 301, as well as Article 88, which 
states that “the high seas shall be reserved for peaceful purposes.”41  
The U.S disagrees, arguing that Article 301 merely restates Article 2(4) 
of the UN Charter, which directs member states to “refrain . . . from the 
threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state.”42 Accordingly, military activities are permitted 
within the EEZ to the extent they do not violate Article 2(4) and are 
otherwise not prohibited by UNCLOS. Within UNCLOS, Article 19(2) 
 
 
 38. See Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Preserving Navigational Rights and Freedoms: The Right to 
Conduct Military Activities in China’s Exclusive Economic Zone, 9 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 9, 29 (2010); 
see also O’ROURKE, supra note 11, at 4. 
 39. See SS Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), 1927 PCIJ (Ser. A) No. 10, at 18; Legality of the Threat or Use 
of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 238 (July 8). 
 40. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 301. 
 41. Id. art. 88. Zhang Haiwen, Is it Safeguarding the FON or Maritime Hegemony of the US?, 9 
CHINESE J. INT’L L. 31, 44–45 (2010); see also Yu Zhirong, Jurisprudential Analysis of the U.S. 
Navy’s Military Surveys in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Coastal Countries, 7 CHINESE MAR. 
STUDIES INST. 37, 45 (2010). 
 42. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol13/iss3/7
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reiterates the Charter’s language and lists activities considered “prejudicial 
to the peace, good order or security of the costal State.”43 Even though 
Article 19 deals specifically with territorial sea, the Article distinguishes 
between “threat or use of force” in 19(2)(a), and an “act aimed at 
collecting information to the prejudice of the defence or security of the 
State” in 19(2)(c).44 The distinction between these two activities is 
important because it demonstrates an understanding that peacetime 
intelligence collection is an activity distinct from the “threat or use of 
force.”45 Foreign ships transiting the territorial sea in innocent passage 
may not collect “information to the prejudice of the defence or security of 
the coastal State,”46 however, since no similar restriction appears in the 
convention regarding the EEZ, the United States argues that such activities 
are permitted in the EEZ.
47 
 
IV. THE FUTURE OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH CHINA SEA AND 
BEYOND 
Although UNCLOS provides no black-letter rule about what military 
activities are permissible without coastal State permission, the use of 
traditional international legal analysis relying on UNCLOS text and 
negotiating history, as well as state practice, suggests that the U.S. legal 
position is stronger than China’s by significant measure. Although China’s 
current arguments seem unlikely to prevail in any traditional legal forum 
or debate, it is increasingly unclear whether that matters. Indeed, Chinese 
arguments regarding the SCS, including military activities in the EEZ, 
seem more designed to win political and diplomatic points that, in turn, 
could ultimately influence state practice to China’s benefit and alter the 
underlying legal framework. 
Consider, for example, that in the post-Snowden era,
48 
international and 
U.S.-domestic audiences may be increasingly resistant to real or perceived 
U.S. surveillance. China has spoken out against surveillance, noting that 
“China’s cultural values uphold the principle of ‘not doing to others what 
 
 
 43. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 19. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Pedrozo, supra note 18, at 216.  
 46. UNCLOS, supra note 1, art. 19. 
 47. Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, Coastal State Jurisdiction over Marine Collection in the Exclusive 
Economic Zone, 7 CHINESE MAR. STUD. INST. 23, 23–36 (2010). 
 48. Jack Shafer, Live and Let Leak: State Secrets in the Snowden Era, 93 FOREIGN AFF. 136 
(2014); The Snowden Effect, ECONOMIST (Aug. 10, 2013), www.economist.com/blogs/democracy 
inamerica/2013/08/american-surveillance. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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you don’t want others to do to you.’”49 Snowden’s leaks of U.S. National 
Security Agency (NSA) surveillance caused an international backlash for 
the United States as reports of U.S. intelligence activities in Mexico,
50
 
Brazil,
51
 and France
52
 came to light. Brazil’s President Dilma Rousseff, to 
cite one example, cancelled her state visit to the United States after 
disclosures that the NSA had been spying in Brazil and her personal 
communications.
53
 At the September 2013 U.N. General Assembly, 
President Rousseff publicly condemned U.S. spying activities and called 
“espionage among friendly nations ‘totally unacceptable.’”54  
In a law of the sea context, the risk for the United States is that the 
Chinese theme will gain favor internationally. By making the surveillance 
culture appear to be a U.S. or western ideal, China may be able to garner 
support from states that do not have sophisticated maritime surveillance 
capabilities. A small number of states have already started changing their 
positions to align more with China. Portugal, a NATO ally, has adopted 
certain restrictions on military activities in the EEZ,
55
 as has Thailand.
56
 
Even Vietnam, with SCS interests similar to the United States, has adopted 
restrictions on military activities in the EEZ.  
U.S. domestic support for overseas surveillance operations could also 
wane, particularly if these operations are perceived as harmful to overall 
U.S.-Chinese relations, or, to the extent overseas surveillance operations 
are premised on reciprocal rights for Chinese vessels to engage in 
surveillance in U.S. waters. The fact that the U.S. public, to the extent it 
was aware, tolerated Soviet AGIs in U.S. waters during the Cold War does 
not necessarily mean similar Chinese surveillance would be accepted 
today. Yet, the willingness to permit reciprocal activities in the U.S. EEZ 
is critical to the U.S. argument that it has these rights in foreign EEZs. 
 
 
 49. Li Keqiang, Premier Li Keqiang Gives Joint Written Interview to Media from ASEAN 
Countries, XINHUANET (Oct. 10, 2013), http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/china/2013-10/08/c_1254 
96903.htm. 
 50. Jens Glusing et al., Fresh Leaks on US Spying, SPIEGEL ONLINE (Oct. 20, 2013), 
www.spiegel.de/international/world/nsa-hacked-email-account-of-mexican-president-a-928817.html. 
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Fortunately for the United States, East Asian maritime nations 
generally favor UNCLOS norms and share a wariness (and in some cases 
outright hostility) toward suspected Chinese territorial ambitions. ASEAN, 
in some degree of partnership with the United States, seems to represent 
the most likely limiting factor to China’s growing power in the region. 
According to China Premier Li Keqiang, “China is now ASEAN’s biggest 
trading partner and ASEAN China’s third largest trading partner.”57 
Economic interdependence may yet provide the necessary disincentive for 
Chinese overreaching in the region.  
In the meantime, however, ASEAN has not persuaded China to 
reconsider its aggressive maritime legal and political claims, and China 
continues to delay the creation of a Code of Conduct for the South China 
with ASEAN. Chinese officials continue to express a willingness to 
engage in dialogue over a Code of Conduct,
58
 however, Chinese Foreign 
Minister Wang Yi made it clear that China prefers a gradual process, 
saying, “[s]ome countries are looking for a quick fix [to the disputes] and 
are hoping to thrash out a code in a day; this approach is neither realistic 
nor serious.”59 After ten years of episodic negotiations, China’s concerns 
about a rushed process ring hollow. Most recently, Chinese officials told 
ASEAN members that China wants to “actively discuss . . . the signing of 
a treaty on good-neighborliness, friendship and cooperation to consolidate 
the political foundation for our strategic mutual trust.”60 China’s 
suggestion for creating new agreements and treaties that have no 
enforcement mechanisms is distracting and prevents ASEAN from taking 
meaningful action to restrain China.  
Like ASEAN, the United States’ ability to influence Chinese positions 
on the EEZ appears limited. At least in the short term, the strategy most 
likely to succeed appears to be continued engagement to reduce the 
possibility of an operational confrontation between ships or aircraft that 
could lead to wider conflict, harming the interests of both nations. Existing 
agreements such as the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations 
for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), the multilateral Code for 
Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES), and the 1998 bilateral U.S.-Chinese 
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Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) provide a framework 
for continued engagement.
61
  
Apart from continued bilateral engagement at the operational level to 
prevent conflict with China in the SCS, and continued multilateral 
engagement with China and ASEAN to encourage Chinese flexibility 
pursuant to mutually advantageous political and economic arrangements, 
the United States has one major opportunity it has so far failed to exploit. 
Were the United States to join UNCLOS, it would, at a minimum, remove 
a significant distraction from international law of the sea discourse and 
perhaps provide the United States an opportunity to change a current 
dynamic that seems increasingly to favor coastal state control over all 
activities, military included, in global EEZs.  
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